Ubuntu One Investigation: Detecting Evidences on Client Machines by Shariati, Mohammad et al.
Ubuntu One Investigation: Detecting Evidences on Client Machines 
Mohammad Shariati
1
; Ali Dehghantanha
1
; Ben Martini
2
; Kim-Kwang Raymond Choo
2
 
1 
School of Computing, Science and Engineering, University of Salford, Greater Manchester, 
United Kingdom  
2
 University of South Australia, GPO Box 2471, Adelaide, SA 5001, Australia 
m_shariati83@yahoo.com; A.Dehghantanha@salford.ac.uk; Ben.Martini@unisa.edu.au; 
Raymond.Choo@unisa.edu.au  
 
 
Abstract 
STorage as a Service (STaaS) cloud services have been adopted by both individuals and 
businesses as a dominant technology worldwide. Similar to other technologies, this widely 
accepted service can be misused by criminals. Investigating cloud platforms is becoming a 
standard component of contemporary digital investigation cases.  Hence, digital forensic 
investigators need to have a working knowledge of the potential evidence that might be 
stored on cloud services. In this chapter, we conducted a number of experiments to locate 
data remnants of users' activities when utilising the Ubuntu One cloud service. We undertook 
experiments based on common activities performed by users on cloud platforms including 
downloading, uploading, viewing and deleting files. We then examined the resulting digital 
artefacts on a range of client devices, namely Windows 8.1, Apple Mac OS X and Apple iOS. 
Our examination extracted a variety of potentially evidential items ranging from Ubuntu One 
databases and log files on persistent storage to remnants of user activities in device memory 
and network traffic.  
Keywords: Ubuntu One; Cloud Forensics; Cloud Storage Forensics; Digital Forensics, 
Storage as a Service Investigation 
1. Introduction 
The term cloud computing refers to a model whereby a user can access computing resources 
via a network on an on-demand basis (Mell and Grance, 2011). Various types of resources 
can be shared between users and in a way that remote clients can utilise them e.g. processing, 
volatile and persistent storage and so on. This pool of resources is commonly available as a 
service via an internal network (private cloud) or publically via the Internet (public cloud). In 
addition to providing the de facto definition of cloud computing the National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) also defined a number of service models including: 
Software as a Service (SaaS), Platform as a Service (PaaS) and Infrastructure as a Service 
(IaaS) (Mell and Grance, 2011). Storage as a Service (STaaS) is an addition to these 
traditional service models. STaaS technologies enable users to store, download and share 
their data in a very accessible manner. There are a number of STaaS service providers 
including Dropbox, Microsoft OneDrive, Google Drive and Ubuntu One. These service 
providers commonly provide personal accounts for minimal or no cost. Cloud Service 
Providers (CSPs) have made significant efforts to attract customers by supporting various 
types of devices ranging from traditional PC platforms such as Windows, Mac OS X and 
Linux to more recent smart phone operating systems such as iOS and Android. Also, CSPs 
generally offer access to their services via standards compliant web browsers including 
Internet Explorer, Google Chrome, Mozilla Firefox and Apple Safari. These features allow 
users to access their data via the majority of internet connected devices.   
However, while STaaS services provide legitimate users with significant utility and 
convenience, they are equally useful to criminals who utilize them for storing and sharing 
illicit materials. The global nature of cloud computing infrastructure contributes to the 
numerous technical and jurisdictional challenges in the identification and acquisition of 
evidential data by law enforcement and national security agencies. 
Digital forensics is the process of identifying, preserving, analysing and presenting evidence 
for use in legal proceedings (McKemmish, 1999). The process of traditional forensic 
investigation is often impeded by some of the key characteristics of the cloud environment 
such as multitenancy and global data distribution. Taylor et al. (2011) highlighted that with 
the advent of cloud computing acquiring and analysing digital evidence from cloud services 
using traditional processes is generally infeasible. One key area of difficulty is in identifying 
the particular service utilized by suspects and then extracting potential remnants of user 
activities involving that service.  
In this chapter we seek to assist forensic investigators and practitioners to detect possible 
evidential remnants derived from the Ubuntu One cloud storage service. The artefacts 
discussed in this chapter should assist in detecting the use of Ubuntu One and the associated 
evidential remnants stored on client devices. The focus of this study is to detect file system, 
RAM, and network artefacts present after utilizing Ubuntu One on the Windows 8.1, Mac OS 
X 10.9 and iOS 7.0.4 platforms.  
In this chapter, we intend to address the following research questions: 
1. What data can be found on a device’s persistent storage after using the Ubuntu One 
client software and the location of data remnants within Windows, Mac OS X and 
iOS devices? 
2. What data can be found in a device’s persistent storage after using Ubuntu One via a 
web browser? 
3. What data can be extracted from volatile memory on Windows and Mac OS X de-
vices when utilising Ubuntu One? 
4. What data can be extracted from collected network traffic after Ubuntu One has been 
accessed on Windows, Mac OS X and iOS devices? 
 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows; in the next section we provide a brief 
review of related work in the field of cloud forensics. In section 3 and 4 we outline both the 
methodology and experiment setup utilised in our experiments, respectively. In section 5 we 
present our research findings and finally in section 6 we conclude the chapter.  
 
2. Related Work 
  
Grispos, et al. (2012) discussed a number of challenges for forensic investigations in the 
cloud, namely creating valid forensic images, recovery of distributed evidence and 
management of large data sources. There are a number of other research studies that highlight 
a number of the major issues of cloud forensics (Biggs and Vidalis, 2009; Birk and Wegener, 
2011; Martini and Choo, 2012, M. Damshenas et al., 2012, F.Daryabar et al., 2013, A. 
Aminnezhad et al., 2013).  
In the case of STaaS forensic research, the majority of existing research has been conducted 
on STaaS clients, with a smaller subset of the published materials focusing on server side 
STaaS investigation. Quick and Choo (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014) have developed a forensic 
framework to identify, acquire and present evidential data remnants of Dropbox, Google 
Drive and Microsoft SkyDrive on the Windows 7 and iPhone platforms. Hale (2013) 
published a similar investigation on the Amazon Cloud Drive client on Windows XP and 7. 
In addition, Chung et al. (2012) analyzed Amazon S3, Google Docs and Evernote and 
outlined a technique to collect data from personal computers and mobile devices. Federici 
(2014) described the concepts and internals of the Cloud Data Imager tool which he 
developed to provide read only access to files and metadata of selected remote folders on 
STaaS services and currently provides access to the Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft 
SkyDrive services. In terms of server STaaS analysis, Martini and Choo (2013) focused upon 
the client and server artefacts created with use of ownCloud. The analysis of the ownCloud 
server component, after analysis of the client component, allows the practitioner to obtain a 
wider range of evidential data (e.g. previous versions of files). 
The numerous publications that investigate STaaS products demonstrate the need for 
researchers to undertake detailed analysis to guide practitioners in collecting all available 
evidence from cloud storage products.  
 
3. Methodology 
Using Ubuntu One as a case study, artefacts were identified that are likely to remain after the 
use of cloud storage, in the context of several experiments conducted on Windows, Mac OS 
X and Apple iPhone 3G clients. As Ubuntu One supports accessing, uploading and sharing 
data using both client software and a browser, we have undertaken experiments across 
multiple platforms to locate evidential data sources on different client devices. 
In each experiment, the investigator first determines whether it is possible to collect volatile 
data on the platform being investigated. If so, the investigator acquires the contents of 
physical memory and captures the network traffic. Next, if non-volatile data can be obtained, 
the investigator gathers data from the file system such as log files, configuration files, internet 
history data, databases and directories. For the Windows and Mac operating systems, we 
were able to collect volatile and non-volatile data, but in the case of iOS only network traffic 
was collected. This was due to the lack of opportunities for forensically sound physical 
memory acquisition on iOS devices.  After collection the investigator, searches for traces of 
the Ubuntu One cloud storage service in the collected images.  
4. Experiment setup 
The research experiment was broken into six stages namely: 1) preparing the Virtual 
Machines and iPhone, including installing the cloud applications; 2) uploading a data set to 
the cloud storage provider; 3) accessing the data through the client application/web browser 
on the VMs and iPhone; 4) perform various file manipulations to the data set on both the 
VMs and iPhone; 5) process the VMs and iPhone to extract volatile and non-volatile data and 
6) use numerous forensic tools to analyse the collected forensic images and present the final 
result. 
We undertook experiments within the following four usage environments: 
1) Windows browser-based (see Section 5.1);  
2) Windows app-based (see Section 5.2);  
3) Mac OS X app-based (see Section 5.3); and 
4) iOS app-based (see Section 5.4). 
We have used Ubuntu One 4.0.2 which provides users with 5GB of free space and utilized 
the following three files from the Enron email dataset, downloaded from the project website 
(http://bailando.sims.berkeley.edu/enron_email.html) on 15
th
 of April 2014, to conduct our 
experiments: 
1. AQUA-OS2.BMP (151KB), 
2. HANGING.DOC (22KB),  
3. HANGING.txt (2KB) 
Different file types were utilised in the experiments to determine whether any discrepancies 
in forensic collection were observable for the different file types. 
Windows 8.1 and Mac OS X 10.9 experiments were conducted on virtualized environments 
utilizing VMware Player 6.0.2. An iPhone 4S with iOS 7.0.6 was used to undertake iOS 
investigation experiments. Each VM was configured with one CPU, 2GB of RAM and 20GB 
of hard disk space. 
Our experiments were designed to simulate common user activities on cloud platforms 
namely uploading, downloading, opening and deleting files. For the purposes of this research, 
one set of credentials were used in all experiments to simplify the location of the credentials 
as part of forensic image examination. 
Web Browser Investigation Experiments Setup: To commence our environment setup for 
web browser analysis we installed the four most popular browsers at the time of research, 
namely Microsoft Internet Explorer (version 10.0.9200.16384), Mozilla Firefox (version 
25.0.1), Google Chrome (version 31.0.1650.63), and Apple Safari (version 5.1.7), on four 
VMs. We then performed a series of upload, open, download and delete operations with one 
VM for each type of operation. Table 1 outlines the list of tools that were copied to each VM 
for monitoring changes and detecting possible evidential data. 
Table1. Software used on VMs for analysis 
Software Version Purpose  
Regshot 1.9.0 Registry Monitor 
Process Monitor 3.05 Process, Registry and File Activity Monitor  
Nirsoft web browser passview 1.43 Saved Password Retrieval  
Digital Detective Net Analysis  1.5 Browser Cache Retrieval  
 
Figure 1 shows the VM hierarchy for our browser based experiments.  
  
 
 
 
Figure 1. VMs created for web browser usage investigation 
Windows App-Based Investigation Experiment Setup: In addition to the series of upload, 
download, open and delete operations, we also experimented installing and uninstalling the 
Ubuntu One app to determine the artefacts that could be detected after such activities on 
client devices, as outlined in Figure 2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. VMs created for Windows and Mac OS X platforms investigation 
Mac OS X App-Based Investigation Experiment Setup: Similar experiments to Windows 
platform were conducted on Mac OS X 10.9 Mavericks. However, the process for 
uninstalling applications on Mac OS X is different in comparison to uninstalling an app in the 
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Windows environment. While most Windows programs include an uninstaller that can be run 
using the Add/Remove Programs tool available in Control Panel, no such feature exists in 
Mac OS X and therefore, most users simply move application bundles to the Trash. 
Assuming that the trash is not emptied, we should be able to locate significant application 
artefacts after an uninstallation of the Ubuntu One client on OS X client machines.  
iOS App-Based Investigation Experiment Setup: For our iOS experiment we used a 
jailbroken iPhone 4S running iOS 7.0.6 to conduct our experiments. iFile 2.0.1-1 was 
installed from Cydia to browse iOS storage directories. The directory that holds the 
associated files and folders of apps from the Apple Store is /private/var/mobile/Applications, 
with each app being assigned a subdirectory name by universally unique identifier (UUID). 
Activating the ‘Applications Names’ option under iFile’s Preferences (File Manager section) 
translates the UUIDs to the human readable names of all the subdirectories. Mobile Terminal 
was another application installed from Cydia enabling execution of UNIX commands in the 
iOS environment.  
5. Discussion and Analysis 
In this section, we explore residual artefacts generated by Ubuntu One when cross-platform 
methods are used to manipulate data hosted on the cloud. Generally, collection of data 
remnants was conducted in two stages. The first stage is the acquisition of live data. The 
analysis of this live (volatile) data is regarded as a significant in recovering sensitive 
information that is available while Ubuntu One is being accessed. The second stage is the 
analysis of non-volatile data remnants that can be located on the local system. These two 
methods complement each other to maximise the amount of available evidential data during 
an investigation. In our research, forensic analysis of live data encompasses analysis of live 
memory and network traffic, while data remnants analysis involves the persistent files such as 
log files, databases and the registry (for Windows platforms).  
 
In all versions of the client applications, after lunching Ubuntu One, the user must enter a 
device name and their authentication credentials. At next launch, Ubuntu One logs-in 
automatically unless the user unlinks the device. 
 
For this research, virtual hard disks, virtual memory, and forensic images of real memory and 
network traffic were examined using multiple forensic tools. We analysed the VM’s VMEM 
file as a memory dump file and the VMDK file as an image of the hard disk using 
AccessData FTK (version 1.86.1). We also used Hex Workshop (version 6.7) for analysis of 
memory and hard disk images, which enabled searching for keywords such as the Ubuntu 
One credentials, files being accessed and words such as “Ubuntu One”, “Ubuntu” and 
“UbuntuOne”. The network traffic was captured and analysed using Wireshark (version 
1.10.2) and further analysis was conducted using NetworkMiner (version 1.5). SQLite DB 
Browser under OSForensics (version 2), PList Explorer (version 1.0) and Notepad++ (version 
6.4) were employed to access and retrieve evidential data from the Ubuntu One databases and 
log files. AccessData Registry Viewer (version 1.7.4.2) and Regripper (version 2.8) were 
utilised to analyze Windows registry and NTUSER.dat files.    
5.1 Windows browser-based  
Ubuntu One allows users to access and manipulate their data on the cloud without installing 
the client application, via a web-browser. From an evidence collection perspective, it can be 
presumed that the browser-based application leaves fewer remnants on local computer 
compared to the full client application. The following stages outline the results of our 
analysis, in a step-by-step manner, for each of the evidence sources identified such as live 
memory and browser cache.  
5.1.1 Memory 
We found live memory forensic analysis very useful for extracting important digital artefacts 
when Ubuntu One was being accessed via the web interface. We utilised two methods to 
detect Ubuntu One user identity information in the live memory: 
Method 1- Searching for the string “login&password=” to retrieve the user’s credentials in 
plain text (see Figure 3): 
 
Figure 3. User credentials located in live memory 
Method 2- Searching for the string “openid.ax.value.email” to retrieve the users email 
address (see Figure 5):  
 Figure 5.Username located in live memory  
We also noted that it was possible to extract the names of files that had been accessed or 
manipulated depending on the specific operation used. A selection of operations and the 
associated artefacts are outlined in Figures 6 to 8.  
 
Figure 6. Filename located after delete operation 
 
 
Figure 7. Filename located after open/download operation 
 
 
Figure 8. Filename in upload operation 
5.1.2 Browser cache and history 
When a user has accessed Ubuntu One via the online interface the web browsers cache and 
history may contain evidential data and should be extracted. Although it will not generally be 
possible to extract the Ubuntu One user credentials from the browser cache and history, 
numerous other evidential artefacts can often be retrieved. While we were not able to extract 
credentials from the cache directly, in the case of the Chrome and Internet Explorer browsers, 
the Nirsoft Web Browser Pass View was able to extract the stored password which we saved 
using the browser.  
For an investigator, the first step in a cloud investigation is often to determine which cloud 
storage services have been used by the suspect, and URL addresses are one source of 
evidential data useful in determining this. In our experiments, we noted a number of web 
addresses in the cache and history that relate to Ubuntu One. These addresses are listed 
below: 
https://media.one.ubuntu.com 
https://one.ubuntu.com 
https://login.ubuntu.com/ 
https://files.one.ubuntu.com/ 
From our analysis of the cache data we determined that there were three web pages that we 
considered to be of particular importance, namely “dashboard.htm”, “files.htm” and 
“+opened.htm”. 
The dashboard.htm file contains the first name and last name that has been entered by the 
Ubuntu One user. In our case, “Test” and “Project” were the first name and last name 
respectively (see Figure 9). 
 
Figure 9. The users full name in dashboard.htm 
The opened.htm file stores the username as well as the full name of the Ubuntu One user (see 
Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10. The users username and full name in opened.htm 
Finally, files.htm cache files often contain filenames, file size and the date and time that an 
operation on the file was carried out (see Figure 11). 
 Figure 11. Filename and associated timestamp in files.htm 
5.1.3 Registry 
There was no information regarding Ubuntu One credentials and usage located in the registry 
except for a “TypedURL” entry from Internet Explorer (see Figure 12). As the name 
suggests, these registry entries are stored when a user types a URL in Internet Explorer (Mee,  
Tryfonas & Sutherland 2006). 
 
Figure12. “TypedURL” in the Windows registry 
5.1.4 Network traffic 
Wireshark was used for collecting the network traffic from Ubuntu One usage, which was 
then analysed using NetworkMiner. We found that all of the collected traffic was encrypted 
due to the use of SSL/TLS when communicating with the Ubuntu One servers. For this 
reason we were unable to extract any data of significant evidential value. However a number 
of common IP addresses were used for Ubuntu One communications, which resolve to 
Ubuntu.com subdomains. Table 2 shows the IP addresses and associated hostnames that were 
extracted from the network traffic capture file after a login to Ubuntu One and contents of the 
user’s account had been accessed/manipulated. 
Table 2. List of IP addresses and hostnames extracted from network traffic. 
IP Address Hostname 
91.189.89.77 - 91.189.89.78 one.ubuntu.com 
91.189.89.182 - 91.189.89.183 media.one.ubuntu.com 
91.189.89.206 - 91.189.89.207 login.one.ubuntu.com 
 
5.2 Windows app-based 
Upon installation the Ubuntu One client software creates a folder named Ubuntu One stored 
in the “\Users\<user>\Ubuntu One” directory, by default. The folder only appears to be 
utilised while the Ubuntu One client is running, during which content can be found in the 
directory as discussed below. By default, this folder is used by Ubuntu One for automatic 
synchronisation of files. In addition to this directory, the installation of Ubuntu One creates 
some folders on the local computer to store persistent data including log files, databases and 
other related files.  Utilizing Process Monitor, we detected the following folders were used by 
Ubuntu One: 
1) C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Ubuntu One 
2) C:\Program Files (x86)\ubuntuone\ 
3) C:\Users\[user]\AppData\Local\ubuntuone 
4) C:\Users\[user]\AppData\Local\xdg\cache 
5) C:\Users\[user]\AppData\Local\xdg\ubuntuone 
6) C:\ProgramData\ubuntuone 
7) C:\Users\[user]\Ubuntu One 
We also noted three processes related to the use of the Ubuntu One client namely ubuntu-sso-
login.exe, ubuntuone-control-panel-qt.exe, ubuntuonesyncdaemon.exe. 
5.2.1 Memory: 
Unlike our browser-based experiments discussed above, analysis of live memory for the 
Windows client did not result in the location of the user’s password in plaintext. However the 
username was located by searching for the string “https://login.ubuntu.com/+id” (see Figure 
14):  
 Figure 14. Located username in client memory 
We were also able to locate filenames for files being accessed from the Ubuntu One default 
folder however this required the use of double escaped backslashes. For example, when the 
default path is C:\Users\username\Ubuntu One, the term to search for in the image of live 
memory is “C:\\\\Users\\\\username\\\\Ubuntu One\\\\” (see Figure 15): 
 
Figure 15. Located filenames in client memory 
5.2.2 File System 
The Ubuntu One folder in Program Files contains many files including .pem and .conf files. 
The .pem files are certificate files in the PEM encoding format and .conf files contain 
configuration values for the Ubuntu One client. There is only one log file in the folder, 
namely install.log, which holds information regarding Ubuntu One’s installation process. 
The Ubuntu One folder in ProgramData also stores configuration files as well log files in .xdg 
format. We determined that information of importance can be recovered from the “xdg” log 
files, including the username used for logging into Ubuntu One and the name and path of the 
files listed below: 
C:\Users\[user]\AppData\Local\xdg\cache\sso\sso-client.log 
C:\Users\[user]\AppData\Local\xdg\cache\sso\sso-client-gui.log 
Surprisingly, no database files were located in Ubuntu One’s folders. 
5.2.3 Event logs 
Windows event logs store useful and valuable information about a system and its users (Do 
et. al 2014). Depending on the enabled logging level and the installed version of Windows, 
event logs may provide investigators with valuable data about application operations, login 
timestamps for users and other system events of interest.  
In our research, we located several logs associated with Ubuntu One within the Application 
and Services log. Searching for the keyword “Ubuntu” in the Windows event log leads to 
several hits as shown in Figure 16. 
 
 
Figure 16. Evidence located in the Windows Event Log 
5.2.4 Registry 
We noted the creation of the following keys in the registry after installation of the Ubuntu 
One client: 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Ubuntu One 
HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Ubuntu One 
Also, searching for the keyword “Ubuntu One” located the following results in the registry: 
HK_Current_User/Software/Microsoft/Windows/Run: 
C:\Program Files (x86)\ubuntu one\dist\ubuntuone-syncdaemon.exe 
HK_Current_User/Software/Microsoft/Windows/Current version/UFH/SHC: 
HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Wow6432Node\Microsoft\Windows\Curr
entVersion\Uninstall\Ubuntu One 4.2 
Opening files synced via the Ubuntu One client leads to addition of entries in the RecentDocs 
registry subkey as expected (see Figure 17): 
 
Figure 17. Recently opening files located in the Windows registry 
We did not locate any data regarding the files that had been uploaded or downloaded or 
Ubuntu One credentials in the registry. 
5.2.5 Network traffic 
Our results for network traffic capture when using the Ubuntu One client was similar to our 
findings for browser-based access as all network data is encrypted using SSL. As such, 
plaintext data of value could not be found. However, the captured network traffic shows some 
differences compared to the network capture acquired using the Ubuntu One online interface. 
Quick and Choo (2013a, 2013b, 2014) observed Online Certificate Status Protocol traffic 
relating to the presented SSL certificate in their captured network traffic. We did not note an 
OSCP query in our network capture. In addition, there were no connections recorded 
associated with the “media.ubuntu.com” subdomain. The list of IP addresses and associated 
hostnames extracted from the network traffic collected is listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. List of IP addresses and hostnames extracted from the Ubuntu One Windows client 
network traffic. 
IP Address Hostname 
91.189.89.77 - 91.189.89.78 one.ubuntu.com 
91.189.89.206 - 91.189.89.207 login.one.ubuntu.com 
 
5.2.6 Uninstallation  
The uninstallation process for Ubuntu One removes all of the files located in the Ubuntu One 
folder in "Program Files" except for the “dist” folder. All other folders associated with 
Ubuntu One remain on the client machine after uninstallation, including the Ubuntu One 
default folder and its contents. 
Uninstallation also only removes Ubuntu One artefacts from the 
“HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software” key, while the remaining registry artefacts are left 
intact. 
5.3 Mac OS X app-based 
After installation of the Ubuntu One client on Mac OS X 10.9 we located the following 
directories created by the installation process: 
/Applications/Ubuntu One.app 
/Users/<user>/Ubuntu One (default Ubuntu One directory) 
/Users/<user>/Library/Application Support/Ubuntuone 
/Users/<user>/Library/Caches/ubuntuone 
/Users/<user>/Library/Caches/sso 
Uninstallation of the Ubuntu One client only removes the first directory while the rest remain 
intact. Some of these directories contained information related to Ubuntu One credentials and 
sync files such as the following: 
~/Library/Caches/sso/sso-client.log 
~/Library/Caches/sso/sso-client-gui.log 
~/Library/Caches/ubuntuone/syncdaemon.log 
The username of the Ubuntu One user can be located within the first two log files as shown in 
Figure 18: 
 
Figure 18. Username located in OS X Ubuntu One log file 
Files which have been synced can be found in the syncdaemon.log log file as can be seen in 
Figure 19: 
 
Figure 19. Synced Filenames located in OS X Ubuntu One log file 
5.3.1 Memory 
We were unable to locate plaintext credentials in our memory capture file (.vmem) of the 
Ubuntu One client on the Mac OS X platform.  However, searching for the Ubuntu One 
default directory string in memory led to a number of filenames when we conducted upload, 
download and delete operations (see Figure 20). 
 
Figure 20. Filenames of synced files located in Mac OS X Memory 
From the other keywords present in the memory capture we were able to determine the 
operation that was being undertaken on the file. For example, “ubuntuone.SyncDaemon.EQ - 
DEBUG - push_event: FS_FILE_CREATE, kwargs: {'path':” and “EVENT: 
FS_FILE_DELETE:{} with ARGS” represent upload and delete operations respectively. 
5.3.2 Network traffic 
The results of our network traffic capture is similar to that of the Windows client application 
discussed above, where we did not note any OCSP queries. Table 4 outlines the list of IP 
addresses (and associated hostnames) extracted from the network traffic capture file. 
Table 4. List of IP addresses and hostnames extracted from OS X client network traffic. 
IP Address Hostname 
91.189.89.77 - 91.189.89.78 one.ubuntu.com 
91.189.89.206 - 91.189.89.207 login.one.ubuntu.com 
 5.4 iOS app-based 
There does not appear to be an official Ubuntu One app available for iOS in the Apple App 
Store. We selected the “U1Files” (version 0.5) unofficial Ubuntu One client app for analysis 
on iOS. We installed the app on a jailbroken device running iOS 7.0.4. Application data for 
apps installed from the App Store is stored in /var/mobile/Applications on iOS. The iFile app 
(version 2.0.1-1) was also installed from Cydia to locate the directories created by U1Files. 
The directory name for U1Files in our case was EDF4B87E-CBC0-466C-2377A089DB10. 
The U1Files directory had five sub directories named Documents, Library, StoreKit, tmp, and 
U1Files.app. Ubuntu One’s default directory was located at the following path: 
/var/mobile/Applications/EDF4B87E-CBC0-466C-2377A089DB10/Documents/Ubuntu One 
We determined that all synced files were stored in that directory. The "Documents" directory 
contained the “u1.db” database, which we found contains the following three tables: 
1- login_info_table (see Figure 21): These appear to be the authentication token components 
stored by the mobile app for authenticating to Ubuntu One services. The topic of 
authentication token use in mobile apps is discussed further in Martini, Do and Choo (2015a, 
2015b). 
 
Figure 21. u1.db login_info_table 
2- nodes_table (see Figure 22): Filenames, last modified date, size and hash values are the 
notable values we located in this table. 
 
Figure 22: u1.db nodes_table information 
3- version_table (see Figure 23): The currently installed version of the U1Files app can be 
retrieved from this table. We also located a file named "iTunesMetadata.plist" which 
contained information including the date that we purchased the U1Files app and the Apple ID 
that was associated with the purchase. 
 Figure 23: version_table 
The results of our network traffic capture analysis on iOS did not differ significantly from our 
findings for Mac OS X. 
6. Conclusion 
Cloud storage has attracted many individuals and business users by offering cost effective 
storage and services across a variety of devices. However, the prevalence of cloud storage has 
provided criminals with opportunities, including the ability to organise their activities in a 
distributed, scalable and somewhat anonymous way. The nature of the cloud environment 
imposes several challenges to the traditional process of digital forensic investigation. Data of 
interest may be segregated on shared storage in different physical locations, where such data 
is subject to foreign laws and regulations (Hooper, Martini & Choo 2013). 
One area of difficulty in cloud forensics is in identifying the use of cloud services by suspects 
and, then determining the particular cloud service used and acquiring the account credentials 
for the service (Quick, Martini & Choo 2014). The evidence sources in a digital investigation 
vary and may include computer hard disks and live memory, network traffic captures and 
mobile devices such as the Apple iPhone and Android mobile devices. The identification and 
collection of suspect’s data must be carried out in timely fashion before the data can be 
moved to another unknown location or even permanently deleted. The legislative process for 
seizing data also differs between jurisdictions. Hence, forensic investigators and practitioners 
need to preserve suspects data as soon as possible after identification. 
In this chapter, we carried out a number of experiments on Ubuntu One to examine the 
artefacts that may be left behind on client devices after use of this cloud service. Firstly, 
Windows 8.1 was utilised to access Ubuntu One via its online interface using four major 
browsers (Internet Explorer, Mozilla Firefox, Apple Safari, and Google Chrome). We then 
deployed Ubuntu One’s client application to Windows 8.1, Apple Mac OS X 10.9 and an 
unofficial Ubuntu One client on iOS 7.0.4. During our experiments on these platforms, we 
simulated a user carrying out common operations on cloud storage, such as uploading, 
downloading and deleting files, with a standard dataset. The evidence sources under 
investigation varied between on operating systems, but included sources such as the 
Windows registry, event logs, network traffic captures, live memory captures and persistent 
file system changes. We found that it was likely that practitioners would be able to locate a 
range of distinct remnants in relation to Ubuntu One usage, but access to valuable evidential 
artefacts (such as authentication and user action logs) varied between platforms. The artefacts 
described in this chapter may assist forensic practitioners in detecting Ubuntu One use and 
hopefully assist in acquiring data of potential evidential value.   
Cloud storage is likely to remain popular and even grow in usage as the dominant technology 
used in file hosting and transmission of files among individuals and organisations. As a 
result, it is recommended that those undertaking future work in this area continue to examine 
cloud storage including investigation of other cloud storage applications using various 
devices and operating systems. Future work also includes further analysis of the 
authentication token system used by the Ubuntu One client, which may allow for the location 
of authentication credentials on the PC operating systems, in addition to the token credentials 
located on the mobile client. 
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